FM 2-0: Intelligence - Chapter 2: Intelligence and Unified Action (2023)

UNIFIED ACTION

2-1. As discussed in JP 1-02 and Chapter 1, unified action describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with govern-mental and NGO agencies) taking place within unified commands, sub-ordinate unified commands, or JTFs under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. Under unified action, commanders integrate joint, single-service, special, and supporting intelligence operations with interagency, nongovernmental, and multinational operations. The ARFOR often brings unique ISR capabilities to unified action operations.

2-2. In a unified action, the intelligence staff takes on additional responsi-bilities, relationships, and infrastructure to execute multi-service and multinational intelligence operations. This chapter discusses the synchro-nization of Army intelligence efforts with joint and other national and international partners to achieve unity of effort and to accomplish the commander's intent.

THE LEVELS OF WAR

2-3. The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels of war are strategic, operational, and tactical (see Figure 2-1).

. The strategic level is that level at which a nation, often as one of a group of nations, determines national and multinational security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish them.
. The operational level is the level at which campaigns and major operations are conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or AOs. It links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives.
. The tactical level is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements.

2-4. Understanding the interdependent relationship of all three levels of war helps commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. Actions within the three levels are not associated with a particular command level, unit size, equipment type, or force or component type. The concept of strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence operations aids JFCs and their J2s in visualizing the flow of intelligence from one level to the next. The concept facilitates allocating required collection, analysis, production, and dissemination resources; and facilitates the assignment of appropriate intelligence tasks to national, theater, component, and supporting intelligence elements.

STRATEGIC

2-5. The President and the Secretary of Defense use strategic intelligence to develop national strategy and policy, monitor the international situation, prepare military plans, determine major weapon systems and force structure requirements, and conduct strategic operations.

Figure 2-1. The Levels of War.

2-6. Intelligence supports joint operations across thdetermines the current capabilities, and forecasts the full spectrum of military operations. It determines the national security and interests. A strategic operation also produces the intelligence required by combatant commanders to prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish missions assigned by higher authorities. Theater intelligence includes determining when, where, and in what strength the adversary will stage and conduct theater level campaigns and strategic unified operations. The intelligence staff should also focus predictive analysis efforts on identifying strategic threat events and how these events will impact US actions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Intelligence operations support IO as well. Intelligence operations support strategic planning by:

. Developing strategic intelligence policy.
. Preparing the strategic collection plan.
. Allocating national intelligence resources.

2-7. Intelligence requirements are those requirements generated from the staff’s IRs regarding the enemy and environment that are not a part of the CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs). Intelligence requirements require collection and can provide answers in order to identify indicators of enemy actions or intent, which reduce the uncertainties associated with an operation. Significant changes (that is, branches and sequels) with an operation usually lead to changes in intelligence requirements. Of particular importance is information relating to enemy or threat strategic vulnerabilities, strategic forces, strategic centers of gravity, and any capabilities relating to the development and employment of CBRNE.

2-8. Global and regional issues and threats are identified and reported to the President and the Secretary of Defense, as well as to the senior military leadership and the combatant commanders. Intelligence requirements include any foreign developments that could threaten the US, its citizens abroad, or multinational military, political, or economic interests. Intelligence also includes identifying hostile reactions to US reconnaissance activities and indications of impending terrorist attacks (I&W). For a complete listing of strategic tasks, refer to CJCSM 3500.04C.

OPERATIONAL

2-9. Combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs and their component commanders are the primary users of intelligence. At the operational echelons, intelligence :

• Focuses on the military capabilities and intentions of enemies and threats.
• Provides analysis of events within the AOI and helps commanders determine when, where, and in what strength the adversary might stage and conduct campaigns and major operations.
• Supports all phases of military operations, from mobilization all the way through redeployment of US forces, and continues during sustainment.
• Supports all aspects of the joint campaign.
• Identifies adversary centers of gravity and HVTs.
• Provides critical support to friendly IO.

2-10 . The JFC and staff allocate intelligence resources and request support from national agencies, other theaters, and multinational partners. During stability operations and support operations, operational intelligence includes training and assisting multinational partners in conducting intelligence operations.

2-11. Combatant commanders use intelligence concerning the nature and characteristics of the battlespace to determine the type and scale of operations. Intelligence also aids in determining the impact of significant regional features and hazards on the conduct of both friendly and adversary operations. Significant regional factors include the natural environment, political, informational, economic, industrial, infrastructure, geographic, demographic, topographic, hydrographic, climatic, populace, cultural, medical, lingual, historical, and psychological aspects of the AOI. Intelligence analysis also assists in determining the ROE and other restrictions which will affect operations in the JFC’s AO.

2-12. Intelligence relating to the adversary’s military and nonmilitary capabilities assists in determining the a dversary’s ability to conduct military operations. Factors that operational intelligence addresses include mobilization potential, force structure (including alliance forces), force dispositions, equipment, military doctrine, C2 structure, and their MDMP. Intelligence includes the continuous refinement of the OBs for the entire array of the enemy’s forces in the AOI. For a complete listing of operational tasks, refer to CJCSM 3500.04C.

US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)

2-13. The U.S. Army has vested its intelligence at the operational level with INSCOM, the major Army command (MACOM) responsible for the Army’s intelligence forces above Corps. INSCOM’s mission is to conduct and support dominant intelligence, security, and information operations for military commanders and national decisionmakers. The INSCOM strategy is to provide superior information and information capabilities to Army commanders, while denying the same to adversaries. Headquarters (HQ), INSCOM, in coordination with its major subordinate commands (MSCs), provides a myriad of general intelligence support operations. INSCOM is providing a globally focused, rapidly deployable, knowledge based, adaptively force packaged capability, supporting commanders and leaders with actionable intelligence at the point of decision. INSCOM serves as the national to tactical Intelligence bridge.

Army Space Program Office (ASPO)

2-14. ASPO executes the Army’s T actical Exploitation of National Capabilities Progr am (TENCAP). The program focuses on exploiting current and future tactical potential of national systems and integrating the capabilities into the Army’s tactical decisionmaking process. Army TENCAP systems enable the tactical commander maximum flexibility to satisfy intelligence needs under a wide range of operational scenarios. ASPO is the point of contact (POC) for all tactical activities between MACOMs or users and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).

TACTICAL

2-15. Tactical commanders use intelligence for planning and conducting battles and engagements. Relevant, accurate, predictive, and timely intelligence allows tactical units to achieve an advantage over their adversaries. Precise and predictive intelligence, on the threat and targets, is essential for mission success. Predictive intelligence also enables the staff to better identify or develop ECOAs. Tactical intelligence :

• Identifies and assesses the enemy’s capabilities, COAs, and vulnera­ bilities, as well as describes the battlespace.
• Seeks to identify when, where, and in what strength the enemy will conduct tactical level operations.
• Provides the commander with information on imminent threats to the force including those from terrorists, saboteurs, insurgents, and foreign intelligence collection.
• Provides critical support to friendly IO.
• Develops and disseminates targeting information and intelligence.

2-16 . Intelligence provides the tactical commander with the information and inte lligence he requires to successfully employ combat forces against enemy forces. Thus, intelligence tasks support the execution of battles and engagements. These intelligence tasks are different from those at other levels due to their ability to immediately influence the outcome of the tactical commander’s mission. They include information gathered from tactical sources, such as combat information, interrogations, debriefings, and eliciting information from captured or misplaced personnel. For a complete listing of tactical tasks, refer to FM 7-15.

CATEGORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

2-17. Directly or indire ctly, the unit receives intelligence from throughout the US intelligence comm unity. The intelligence operations and products of national, joint, and service organizations that make up the intelligence community fall into one of six categories:

• I&W.
• Current intelligence.
• GMI.
• Target intelligence.
• S&T intelligence.
• CI.

2-18 . The categories of intelligence are distinguishable from each other primarily by the purpose of the intelligence product. The categories can overlap and some of the same intelligence is useful in more than one category. Depending upon the echelon, intelligence organizations use specialized procedures to develop each category of intelligence. The following information describes each category.

INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS

2-19. Indications and warnings (I&W) are those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the US or allied and/or coalition military, political, or economic interests or to US citizens abroad. I&W includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear or non-nuclear attack on the US, its overseas forces, or alliled and/or coalition nations; hostile reactions to US reconnais­sance activities; terrorist attacks; and other similar events. (JP 3-13). I&W comes from time-sensitive information and analysis of developments that could involve a threat to the US and multinational military forces, US political or economic interests, or to US citizens. While the G2/S2 is primarily responsible for producing I&W intelligence, each element, such as the MPs conducting PIO , within every unit contributes to I&W through awareness of the CCIRs and reporting related information.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

2-20. Curr ent intelligence involves the integration of time-sensitive, all- source intelligence and information into concise, accurate, and objective reporting on the battlespace and current enemy situation. One of the most important forms of current intelligence is the enemy situation portion of the COP . The G2/S2 is responsible for producing current intelligence for the unit. Current intelligence supports ongoing operations across full spectrum operations. In addition to the current situation, current intelligence should provide projections of the enemy’s anticipated situations (estimates) and their implications on the friendly operation.

GENERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

2-21. GMI is intelligence concerning military capabilities of foreign countries or organizations or topics affecting potential US or multinational military operations relating to armed forces capabilities, including OB, organization, training, tactics, doctrine, strategy, and other factors bearing on military strength and effectiveness and area and terrain intelligence. This broad category of intelligence is normally associated with long-term planning at the national level. However, GMI is also an essential tool for the intelligence staff and should be in place long before the start of preparations for a particular military operation. An up-to-date, comprehensive intelligence database is critical to the unit’s ability to plan and prepare rapidly for the range of operations and global environments in which it may operate. GMI supports the requirement to quickly respond to differing crisis situations with corresponding intelligence spanning the globe. One of the many places to get information for GMI is the medical intelligence database. The G2/S2 planner develops his initial IPB from GMI products.

2-22. The G2/S2 develops and maintains the unit’s GMI database on potential threat forces and environments based on the commander’s guidance. As an essential component of intelligence readiness, this database supports the unit’s planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of operations. The G2/S2 applies and updates the database as it executes its intelligence production tasks.

TARGET INTELLIGENCE

2-23. T arget intelligence is the analysis of enemy units, dispositions, facilities, and systems to identify and nominate specific assets or vulnerabilities for attack, re-attack, or exploitation (for intelligence). It consists of two mutually supporting production tasks: target development and combat assessment.

• Target development is the systematic evaluation and analysis of target systems, system components, and component elements to determine HVTs for potential attack through maneuver, fires, or non-lethal means.
• Once attacked, combat assessment provides a timely and accurate estimate of the affects of the application of military force (lethal or non­ lethal) an IO on targets and target systems based on predetermined objectives.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

2-24. Scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign S&T information which covers foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques and S&T characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel, the research and development (R&D) related thereto, and the production methods employed for their manufacture.

2-25. S&T intelligence concerns foreign developments in basic and applied sciences and technologies with warfare potential. It inc ludes characteristics, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and limitations of all weapon systems, subsystems, and associated materiel, as well as related R&D. S&T intelli­ gence also addresses overall weapon systems and equipment effectiveness. Specialized organizations : such as the Defense Intelligence Agency ( DIA ) Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), INSCOM, Air Missile Defense ( AMD ), Area Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), and National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) : produce this category of intelligence. The G2/S2 establishes instructions within SOPs, orders, and plans for handling and evacuating captured enemy materiel ( CEM ) for S&T intelligence (S&TI) exploitation.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

2-26. As previously defined at the end of Chapter 1, CI attempts to identify and reco mmend countermeasures to the threat posed by foreign intelligence security services (FISS) and the ISR activities of non-state entities such as organized crime, terrorist groups, and drug traffickers. CI analysis incorporates information from all sources as well as the results of CI collection, investigations, and operations to analyze the multidiscipline threat posed by foreign intelligence services and activities.

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

2-27. There are many organizations in the intelligence community that support military operations by providing specific intelligence products and services. The J2/G2/S2 and his staff must be familiar with these organizations and the methods of obtaining information from them as necessary. Figure 2-2 shows organizations that compose the intelligence community.

Figure 2-2. Intelligence Community Membership.

DOD AGENCIES

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

2-28. DIA is a combat support agency and a major collector and producer in the defense intelligence community. The DIA supports the full spectrum of operations to in clude basic MI, counterterrorism, counterdrugs, medical intelligence, WMD and proliferation, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and multinational support, missile and space intelligence, noncombatant evacua­tion operations (NEOs), targeting, combat assessment, and battle damage assessment (BDA).

National Security Agency (NSA)

2-29. NSA ensures cryptologic planning and support for joint operations. Working with the tactical cryptologic units of a command, the NSA provides SIGINT and information security (INFOSEC), encompassing communications security (COMSEC) and computer security, as well as telecommunications support and operations security (OPSEC). The people and equipment providing SIGINT, INFOSEC, and OPSEC constitute the United States Cryptologic System (USCS). The NSA, through the USCS, fulfills cryptologic command and/or management, readiness, and operational responsibilities in support of military operations according to the Secretary of Defense tasking, priorities, and standards of timeliness.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

2-30. The NGA (formerly National Imagery and Mapping Agency [(NIMA)] mission is to provide timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence and geo­ spatial information in support of national security objectives of the United States. The Director of NGA a dvises the Secretary of Defense, Director Central Intelligence ( DCI ), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the combatant commanders on imagery, IMINT, and geospatial information. The Operations Directorate, Customer Support Office, is the focal point for interface with external customers, including the JCS, combatant commands, services, and national and defense agencies.

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

2-31. The NRO develops and operates unique and innovative space reconnaissance systems and conducts intelligence-related activities essential for US security. The r ole of the NRO is to enhance US government and military information superiority across full spectrum operations. NRO responsibilities include supporting I&W, monitoring arms control agreements, and performing crisis support to the planning and conduct of military operations. The NRO accomplishes its mission by building and operating IMINT and SIGINT reconnaissance satellites and associated communications systems

2-32. Naval intelligence products and services support the operating naval forces, the Department of the Navy, and the maritime intelligence require ments of national level agencies. Naval intelligence operates the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC). Naval intelligence responsibilities include maritime intelligence on global merchant affairs, counter-narcotics, fishing issues, ocean dumping of radioactive waste, technology transfer, counter-proliferation, cryptologic related functions, CI, I&W support, management of Coast Guard collection, and development of new weapons systems and countermeasures.

US Marine Corps (USMC)

2-33. USMC intelligence provides pre-deployment training and force contingency planning for requirements that are not satisfied by theater, other service, or national capabilities. The Marine Corps Intelligence Agency (MCIA) handles the integration, development, and application of GMI, technical information, all-source production, and open-source information.

US Air Force ( USAF)

2-34. USAF ISR assets fill a variety of roles to meet US national security requirements. The USAF operates worldwide ground sites and an array of airborne ISR platforms to meet national level intelligence requirements. To support day-to-day USAF operations and to meet specific USAF requirements, intelligence professionals at the wing and squadron levels use suites of interoperable analysis tools and dissemination systems to tailor information received from all levels and agencies in the intelligence community. USAF responsibilities include all-source information on aero­ space systems and potential adversaries’ capabilities and intentions, cryptologic operations, I&W, IO, and criminal investigative and CI services.

NON-DOD AGENCIES

2-35. Although the primary focus of non-DOD members of the intelligence community is strategic intelligence and support to the President and the Secretary of Defense, these agencies also produce intelligence and intelligence products that support operational and tactical ARFOR. This responsibility includes assessing potential issues and situations that could impact US national security interests and objectives. These agencies identify global and regional issues and threats. Some of the intelligence products and services these agencies provide are essential to accurate assessment of the threat and battlespace, particularly during stability operations and support operations.

Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA )

2-36. The C IA’s primary areas of expertise are in HUMINT collection, imagery, all-source analysis, and the production of political and economic intelligence. C IA and military personnel staff the CIA ’s Office of Military Affairs (OMA). As the CIA ’s single POC for military support, OMA negotiates, coordinates, manages, and monitors all aspects of agency support for military operations. This support is a continuous process, which the agency enhances or modifies to respond to a crisis or developing operation. Interaction between OMA and the DCI representatives to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the combatant commands facilitates providing national level intelligence in support of joint operations, contingency and operations planning, and exercises.

Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

2-37. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research coor dinates programs for intelligence, analysis, and research; it produces intelligence studies and current intelligence analyses essential to foreign policy determination and execution. Its subordinate Bureau of International Narcotics Matters develops, coordinates, and implements international narcotics control assistance activities. It is the principal POC and provides policy advice on international narcotics control matters for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the NSC , and the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The Bureau also oversees and coordinates the international narcotics control policies, programs, and activities of US agencies.

Department of Energy, Office of Nonproliferation and National Security

2-38. The Department of Energy’s Office of Nonproliferation and National
Security assists in the development of the State Department’s policy, plans, and procedures relating to arms control, nonproliferation, export controls, and safeguard activities. Additionally, this office is responsible for :

• Managing the department’s R&D program.
• Verifying and monitoring arms implementation and compliance activities.
• Providing threat assessments and support to headquarters and field offices.

Department of the Treasury

2-39. Treasury Department’s intelligence-related missions include producing and disseminating foreign intelligence relating to US economic policy and participating with the Department of State in the overt collection of general foreign economic information.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

2-40. The FBI is the principal investigative arm of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and has primary responsibility for CI and counterterrorism operations conducted in the U S. CI operations contemplated by any other organizations in the US must be coordinated with the FBI. Any overseas CI operation conducted by the FBI must be coordinated with the CIA .

Department of Homeland Security

2-41. The mission of the Department of Homeland Security is to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the US from terrorist threats or attacks. The organizational construct of homeland security mission is a framework of prepare, deter, preempt, defend, and respond. Component agencies will analyze threats and intelligence, guard our borders and airports, protect our critical infrastructure, and coordinate the response of our nation for future emergencies. The component agencies of the department include :

• US Coast Guard (USCG).
• US Customs Service.
• US Border Patrol.
• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
• Immigration and Natu ralization Service ( INS ).
• Transportation Sec urity Administration.
• Federal Protective Service.
• Office of Domestic Preparedness.

United States Coast G uard (USCG)

2-42 . The USCG, subordinate to the Department of Homeland Security, has unique missions and responsibilities as both an armed force and a law enforcement agen cy ( LEA ), which makes it a significant player in several national security issues. The USCG intelligence program supports counter- drug operations, mass seaborne migration operations, alien migration interdiction operations, living marine resource enforcement, maritime intercept operations, port status and/or safety, counterterrorism, coastal and harbor defense operations, and marine safety and/or environmental protection.

Other Agencies

2-43. There are a number of US Government agencies and organizations, not members of the intelligence community, that are responsible for collecting and maintaining information and statistics related to foreign governments and international affairs. Organizations such as the Library of Congress, the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, the National Technical Information Center, US Information Agency, US Information Service, and the US Patent Office are potential sources of specialized information on political, economic, and military-related topics. The intelligence community may draw on these organizations to support and enhance research and analysis and to provide relevant information and intelligence for planners and decisionmakers. Many other US Government agencies may become directly involved in supporting DOD especially during stability operations and support operations. (See JP 2-02 for a description of agency support to joint operations and intelligence.) These organizations include :

• Department of Transportation.
• Disaster Assistance Response Team within the Office of Foreign Disaster.
• US Agency for International Development.
• NGA.

UNIFIED ACTION INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

2-44 . In unified action, ARFOR synchronize their actions with those of other participants to achieve unity of effort and to accomplish the combatant commander’s objectives. Unified action links subordinates to the combatant commander under combatant command (command authority) (COCOM). Multinational, interagency, and nonmilitary forces work with the combatant commander through cooperation and coordination. Combatant commanders form theater strategies and campaigns, organize joint forces, designate operational areas, and provide strategic guidance and operational focus to subordinates. The aim is to achieve unity of effort among many diverse agencies in a complex environment. Subordinate JFCs synchronize joint operations in time and space, direct the action of foreign military forces (multinational operations), and coordinate with governmental and NGOs (interagency coordination) to achieve the same goal.

2-45. The J2 staff provides intelligence promptly, in an appropriate form, and by any suitable means to those who need it. Intelligence personnel ensure that the consumers understand the intelligence and assist them as they apply the intelligence to their operations.

2-46. Dissemination requires establishing appropriate communications systems and procedures. The J2 and other intelligence personnel must fully participate in all operation planning and execution, and develop close working relationships with the JFC and other staff elements.

2-47. The commander and staff assess intelligence operations to determine their effectiveness and to make any necessary improvements. The intelli­ gence process functions presented in Chapter 4 provide the criteria for evaluating intelligence operations.

JOINT INTELLIGEN CE OPERATIONS

2-48. The JTF commanders and his intelligence staff mu st :

• Understand the intelligence requirements of superior, subordinate, and component commands.
• Identify organic intelligence capabilities and shortfalls.
• Access theater and national systems to ensure appropriate intelligence and CI products are available to the JTF.

2-49. The JTF’s intelligence effort focuses on integrating multi-source information and multi-echelon intelligence into all-source intelligence products that provide clear, relevant, and timely knowledge of the enemy and battlespace. These products must be in formats that are readily understood and directly usable by the recipient in a timely manner. They must neither overload the user nor the communications architecture.

2-50. The J2 is the JTF commander’s focal point for intelligence. The J2 directly supports the JFC’s responsibilities for determining objectives, directing operations, and evaluating the effects of those operations. The J2 supports the execution of the plan with the intelligence needed to sustain the operation, attain joint force objectives, provide support to subordinate commands, and continually support FP efforts. The J2 analyzes the potential threat situation and provides assessments to support friendly opportunities. The J2 then supports the execution of the plan with the operational intelligence needed to sustain the operations, attain joint force objectives, and support FP. To maintain the initiative, the JFC will seek to get inside the adversary’s decisionmaking cycle; that is, the JFC will seek to develop procedures and an organization in order to receive new and accurate intelligence and respond to the new situation faster than the adversary. The J2 must help in identifying the adversary’s decisionmaking cycle and identifying vulnerabilities that may be exploited. The J2 also :

• Ensures the provision of the required ISR support to the JTF and its subordinate functional and service components.
• Assists the JTF commander in defining intelligence responsibilities and PIRs.
• Actively participates in joint staff planning and in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing ISR efforts. This includes leading the JTF’s joint collection board and providing representation at the joint targeting board.

2-51. Figure 2-3 shows a typical JTF J2 organization. The overall organi­ zation of the JTF and operations will dictate actual composition of the J2. At a minimum, a core element of analytical, ISR management, and admin­ istrative capabilities is required.

Figure 2-3. Typical Joint Task Force J2 Organization.

Considerations In Joint Intelligence Operations

2-52. The Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and SOF must provide globally responsive assets to support the combatant commanders’ theater strategies and the national security strategy. The capabilities of the other armed forces complement those of ARFOR. During joint operations, they provide support consistent with JFC-directed missions. When conducting joint intelligence operations, there are a number of unique problems that can arise due to the complexity of integrating the efforts of the different services and commands. Elements affecting joint intelligence operations among the different services include the following:

• Intelligence liaison is critical to the success of intelligence operations and requires early establishment, particularly between units that have not routinely trained together and possess differing capabilities. As a minimum, organizations exchange liaison teams with the higher echelon organization. Additional liaison may be necessary to facilitate joint force collection, production, or dissemination requirements. Liaison teams :
• Support planning and C2 of intelligence operations.
• Ensure timely two-way flow of intelligence between commands.
• Manage intelligence and resource requirements of the subordinate command.
• Advise the commander on service ISR capabilities, limitations, and employment.
• Commanders and staffs use IPB to understand the battlespace and develop or refine plans and orders. IPB products exchanged between echelons ensure a common picture of the battlespace and estimate of the situation.
• Communications considerations for joint operations include :
• Planning for intelligence communications transition to facilitate execution of branches or sequels to the plan or to accommodate shifting of the main effort from one force to another.
• Identifying the initial communications architecture to include establishing procedures and protocols for information exchanges (databases, text, imagery, voice, and video).
• Balancing the availability of service-unique intelligence systems between echelons or services. This may require each service providing additional resources. The senior commander is respon­ sible for allocating resources.
• Disseminating intelligence between commands and services. Additional communications equipment, intelligence terminals, and personnel may be required to balance capabilities between services.
• Identifying the databases each service possesses or has access to; determining which databases will support the operation and, if necessary, merge them into a single database; and ensure access by the entire force.
• Providing a focal point for subordinate command access to national or joint intelligence is essential. The senior commander will request and allocate resources required to support this access.

2-53. The JFC’s intelligence requirements, concept of operation, and intent drive the ISR effort. The different organizations and services participating in joint intelligence operations must continuously share information, intel­ ligence, and products to satisfy requirements. See FM 2-01 for details on intelligence requirements and RM. Activities required to facilitate an effect­ tive joint collection effort include

• Coordinating intelligence and ISR operations to optimize capabilities of collection assets and reduce duplication of effort.
• Integrating supporting national and theater intelligence collection assets into the intelligence synchronization plan.
• Establishing procedures for tracking and handing off HPTs between services and echelons.
• Establishing procedures for cueing Army and other service collection assets.
• Coordinating airspace for ISR assets.
• Maximizing available linguist capabilities. Shortages of military linguists trained in target languages may require cross-leveling Army and other service linguists.

2-54. Reporting and intelligence production considerations in joint operations include :

• Establishing production criteria and thresholds that produce timely and relevant intelligence keyed to the commander’s intelligence and targeting requirements. The ISM, attack guidance matrix ( AGM ), and HPT list are examples of tools used to support joint intelligence and targeting efforts. The sharing of these products to all echelons and services is crucial.
• Establishing common methodology and criteria for producing the BDA and supporting the combat assessment function.
• Establishing set standards for the number and frequency of periodic reports such as intelligence summaries (INTSUMs).

Joint Intelligence Architecture

2-55. In addition to the J2 staffs at every joint level of command, the key organizations in the joint intelligence architecture are the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) (see Figure 2-4), the Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) or Joint Analysis Centers (JACs) of the unified commands, and, when formed, the JTF’s joint intelligence support element (JISE). Working together, these organizations play the primary role in managing and controlling joint intelligence operations. The formal relationships which link these organizations facilitate information management and optimize complementary intelligence functions by echelon without obstructing the timely flow of intelligence up, down, or laterally.

Figure 2-4. National Military< Joint Intelligence Center.

2-56. The NMJIC is the focal point for intelligence activities in support of joint operations. The NMJIC is the CJCS J2 intelligence watch within the National Military Command Center (NMCC) in the Pentagon. When the assigned or attached assets cannot satisfy the combatant commander and the JTF commander’s crisis-related and time-sensitive intelligence requirements, the NMJIC, as part of the J2’s staff, sends tasks to appropriate agencies to fill the requirements. During crises, the NMJIC expands as necessary to establish a working group, intelligence task force, or an expanded intelligence task force. The NMJIC participates in targeting by developing national level target lists. When requested, the NMJIC supports the theater in performing BDA. Besides supporting the combatant commands and JTFs, the NMJIC supports any multinational partners and prescribed international organiza­ tions.

2-57. The JIC is organized in accordance with the combatant commander’s prerogatives, but normally performs the general functions described in JP 2-0 and specific unified command intelligence TTP. The JIC is responsible for providing intelligence to JTF and its subordinates during military operations. If the JIC cannot meet the combatant commander’s requirements, the JIC forwards requests to the NMJIC or to subordinate command levels through established channels, using standard command procedures. In some cases, the JIC may also ensure timely support by approving a direct communication path, in advance, between requesters such as the JTF JISE and outside producers. In this case, the parties must inform the JIC of all requests as they occur. This method is most appropriate when the parties require products and services, which the JIC does not routinely produce.

2-58. At the discretion of the JTF commander, the J2 can establish a JISE during the crisis or preparation stage for operations to augment the J2 staff. The JISE is a tailored subset of the JIC or the intelligence organization of the service component designated as the JTF headquarters.

2-59. Under the direction of the J2, the JISE normally manages the intelligence collection, production, and dissemination for the JTF. The JISE provides intelligence to JTF operational forces and performs common intelligence functions. By design, the JISE is scaleable and can expand to meet the needs of the JTF and the operating environment. It is composed of analytical experts, analysis teams, and ISR managers that provide services and products, which the JTF, JTF staff, and subordinate components require. These experts, mentioned above, focus on solving the operational intelligence problems of concern to the JTF commander. The JISE’s capability to perform all-source analysis and ISR synchronization is key to producing operational intelligence that is timely, relevant, and complete. Figure 2-5 illustrates the features of a typical JISE.

Figure 2-5. Typical Joint Intelligence Support Element.

Joint Task Force Intelligence Organizations

2-60. In addition to the JISE, the JTF commander and J2 may require other supporting JICs or teams based on projected operations. The JTF commander may make a request to the NMJIC for specific national intelligence agency capabilities. The NMJIC evaluates and coordinates the JTF commander’s requirements with the J3, J5, and national intelligence agencies and tailors the composition of the deployment packages to meet those needs. The deployment packages, such as the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST), provide access to the entire range of capabilities resident in the national intelligence agencies and can focus those capabilities on the JTF commander’s intelligence requirements. The J2X manages and coordinates the HUMINT and CI activities of national, theater, and service components operating within the JTF’s JOA. The Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC) assists in management of recovery, exploitation, and disposal of captured enemy equipment (CEE). The JTF commander’s requirements dictate the composition and tailoring of such deployment packages.

Augmentation Considerations

2-61. Depending on the scale of the operations, the intelligence organizations described above and those of the JTF’s subordinate command may require personnel augmentation. Optimum use of available intelligence assets is essential to ensure quality support in meeting the JTF commander’s requirements.

2-62. The demand for additional intelligence increases significantly during crisis and wartime operations. As the need arises for more intelligence personnel, the intelligence presence also increases at all command levels. Locating additional intelligence personnel and knowing how to integrate those personnel into the operation is vital. The JTF J2 should identify intelligence personnel augmentation requirements in accordance with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction 1301.01. The combatant commander’s joint table of mobilization and distribution (JTMD) also contains the standing augmentation requirements. The JTMD should reflect the need for either IMA or Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) personnel. The combatant commander and the JTF refine personnel requirements and initiate requests when they anticipate or start an operation.

2-63. A consideration for the JTF when requesting support or augmentation is that these national level teams and individual augmentees are not totally self-contained elements; rather they require logistic, information, and other support from the supported command. Each deployment is unique based on mission, duration, team composition, and capabilities required. A full NIST, for example, requires a private, access-controlled area within a sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) work environment and dedicated secure communications.

2-64. For more information on intelligence operations as they apply to other armed services, see the individual service intelligence doctrine. See also JP 2-0 series, JP 3-0, JP 3-55, and JP 5-0 for more details on joint intelli­ gence operations and considerations.

Multinational Intelligence

2-65. Multinational intelligence operations take place within the structure of an alliance or coalition. Some multinational military organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN Command in the Republic of Korea ( ROK ), are highly structured and enduring. Others, such as the coalition formed during the Gulf War, are less formal and temporary.

2-66. In multinational operations, the multinational force commander (MNFC) exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. Therefore, in most multinational operations, the JTF must share intelligence, as necessary, for mission accomplishment with foreign military forces and coordinate exchange of intelligence with those forces.

2-67. In some circumstances, the JTF may need to seek authority to go outside the usual political-military channels to provide information to NGOs. The JTF must tailor intelligence policy and dissemination criteria to each multinational operation.

INTELLIGENCE REACH

2-68. Military forces use intelligence reach to rapidly access information, receive support, and conduct collaboration and information sharing with other units and organizations unconstrained by geographic proximity, echelon, or command.

2-69. Intelligence reach supports minimizing the deployed footprint of ISR assets. By providing enhanced information and tailored intelligence products, intelligence reach can greatly enhance the intelligence capabilities of the unit and play a significant role in improving the commander’s ability to make decisions on the battlefield. It allows the commander to harness national, joint, foreign, and other military organization resources. Table 2-1 shows examples of partners and sources for intelligence reach.

2-70. Detailed planning and training are critical to the success of intelligence reach operations. The following are steps that the staff can take to ensure optimal use, operability, and effectiveness of intelligence reach:

• Establish data exchange methods and procedures.
• Establish electronic message transfer procedures.
• Establish homepages for identified forces.
• Establish POCs for I&W centers, production centers, Theater JICs, DIA , INSCOM, and their major subordinate commands such as NGIC and the theater intelligence brigades and groups.
• Ensure the intelligence staff has the necessary personnel, training, automated systems, bandwidth, and resources to conduct intelligence reach.
• Determine IRs through staff planning. Develop production require­ ments for identified intelligence gaps.
• Order geospatial products for the projected joint AOI.
• Establish and maintain a comprehensive directory of intelligence reach resources before deployment and throughout operations. The value of intelligence reach will greatly increase as the staff develops and maintains ready access to rich information resources. These resources are numerous and may include, for example, Army, Joint, DOD, non- DOD, national, commercial, foreign, and university research programs. Know what types of information the resources can provide. Con­ tinuously expand the resource directory through identification of new resources.
• Use intelligence reach first to fill intelligence gaps and requirements and answer RFIs. This technique can preclude unnecessary tasking or risk to limited ISR assets.
• Maintain continuous situational understanding and anticipate intelli­gence requirements. Use intelligence reach to fulfill these requirements and provide the results to the commander and staff for planning and decisionmaking.
• Exchange intelligence reach strategies with other units.
• Present the information retrieved through intelligence reach in a usable form. Share the information derived from intelligence reach with subordinate, lateral, and higher echelons. Ensure follow-on forces have all information as well.

INTELLIGENCE REACH COMPO NENTS

2-71. Intelligence reach requires the G2/S2 to develop a strategy on how best to support the unit’s mission with intelligence reach capabilities. There are six basic components of the strategy:

• Push
• Datab ase Access.
• Pull.
• Broadcast Services.
• Collaborative Tools.
• Requirements Management.

Push

2-72. Push occurs when the producers of intelligence or information are knowledgeable of the customer’s requirements and are able to send the desired intelligence to the customer without further requests. Push is accomplished through the most appropriate or efficient dissemination means. Unless coordinated as an acceptable dissemination method, push is not accomplished solely by posting intelligence products on a web page. The entity that posts the document must ensure the intended recipient is aware of the product’s location or has received the product.

2-73. Push begins with the statement of intelligence interest ( SII ). The SII establishes the unit’s intelligence and IRs. The SII is prepared by intelligence staff organizations to register their interest in receiving recurring hardcopy and softcopy reports, studies, and publications covering a wide variety of intelligence subjects. The J2/G2/S2 works with the Department of the Army Production and Dissemination Management (DAPDM) to establish a profile for information transfer. Intelligence reports or information meeting the unit’s requirements are then automatically sent directly to the unit’s classified or unclassified networks or communication systems.

2-74. Organizations that push information and data down to subordinate units must be careful of the amount, detail, and focus of the information they are sending. Too much information will overwhelm the subordinate unit. Crucial information may be lost in the midst of an overabundant flow of information, much of which is of little use. Intelligence reach often runs more efficiently if the user pulls the information or at least focuses the intelligence producers to send the appropriate information with the correct level of detail at the appropriate time.

Database Access

2-75. Access to local, theater, DOD, non-DOD, and commercial databases allows analysts to leverage stored knowledge on topics ranging from basic demographics to OB information. A validated DIA Customer Number (acquired by the J2/G2/S2) in combination with Secret Internet Protocol Network (SIPRNET) and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) connectivity establishes access to most of the databases online. The challenge for an analyst is to gain an understanding of the structure, contents, strengths, and weaknesses of the database regardless of database type. Additionally, the procedures are often difficult for extracting portions or downloading and transferring the database to unit level automated information systems.

2-76. Each intelligence discipline has unique databases established and maintained by a variety of agencies. Database access is accomplished through unit or agency homepages via SIPRNET (Intelink-S) and JWICS (Intelink). The DAPDM office, upon approving the unit’s SII , validates the requirement for access to the majority of these databases. Units coordinate with the DA dissemination and program manager (DPM) and/or the agency for access to those databases requiring passwords and permissions beyond normal Intelink-S and Intelink access.

Pull

2-77. Pull occurs when the requestor is familiar enough with existing databases and products to be able to anticipate the location of the desired information. Knowledge of both the types and locations of intelligence databases can greatly increase the efficiency of the Intelligence BOS by saving time and effort on the part of analysts at every echelon.

2-78. The G2/S2 must also ensure that intelligence reach capability extends to multinational forces, augmentees, and other services or organizations working as part of the JTF. The G2/S2 must forward relevant intelligence to units which do not possess the necessary automation to conduct intelligence reach.

Broadcast Services

2-79. Broadcast services are an integrated, interactive dissemination system, focusing on tactical user’s IRs using joint message formats. The theater broadcast’s data prioritization and processing occur through information management. Selected tactical, theater, DOD, and national collectors broadcast their messages using prescribed message formats. The analyst decides which types of messages are required. Broadcast service data is responsive to the operational commander's information needs and allows tactical users to construct successively detailed pictures of the battlespace.

2-80. Tactical users require intelligence and information to be available at the lowest classification level possible (for example, collateral SECRET) and releasable, as necessary, to multinational partners. Broadcast service information management will adhere to national policy as it relates to the provision of data to NATO or multinational partners.

Collaborative Tools

2-81. Collaboration is the sharing of knowledge, expertise, and information, normally online, and may take numerous forms. Collaborative tools are computer-based tools (groupware) that help individuals work together and share information. They allow for virtual online meetings and data sharing. As an example of the use of collaborative tools, the President or the Secretary of Defense and DOD during a crisis situation will establish a number of crisis action teams (CATs) or joint interagency working groups (JIAWGs). These groups or teams are formed to address specified subjects or topics in support of the warfighter or decisionmaker. The groups will focus on the crisis and normally publish their products on a homepage. Analysts with online access can participate in a number of ways. This includes passively accessing the homepages to study the products, sending queries to the identified POCs, or by having their organization join the CAT or JIAWG. Table 2-2 shows some examples of collaborative tools.

Requirements Management

2-82. The RM system provides a mechanism for submitting RFIs, tasking, and managing ISR assets. Analysts who are trained and familiar with the RM process and the various tasking procedures can leverage its systems for refined information. Each intelligence discipline has established procedures for requesting specific information. It is therefore advantageous to have someone familiar with each discipline’s procedures to participate in synchronizing the ISR effort. For example, an analyst receives a HUMINT­ based intelligence information report, which provides information on an event or subject. If he requires more refined data or clarification, he should submit a time-sensitive requirement or a source-directed requirement. This creates a two-way communication from the field to the collectors without creating additional standing requirements. The more familiar the analyst is with the RM process, the better he can leverage it.

2-83. The intelligence reach component of RM includes the ability of an intelligence officer at any level to request information, which is beyond what is available at his location. The normal procedure for obtaining intelligence or information not obtainable through the use of available ISR assets is to submit an RFI to the next higher echelon. Users enter RFIs into the RM system. See ST 2-33.5 for more information on intelligence reach operations and FM 2-01 for more information on RM.

Table 2-2. Examples of Collaborative Tools.